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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Deborah Revnew ) Docket No.  2016-06-0320 
 ) 
v. ) State File No.  16063-2016 
 ) 
Amazon.com, Inc., et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’  ) 
Compensation Claims, ) 
Joshua D. Baker, Judge )
 
  
Affirmed and Remanded—Filed October 3, 2016 
 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, the employer challenges the trial court’s decision to award 
medical benefits to an employee alleging injuries resulting from chemical exposure 
during the course of her employment.  The trial court found the employee was likely to 
succeed in establishing that she suffered a compensable injury and ordered the employer 
to provide medical treatment.  The employer has appealed, arguing that the evidence does 
not support the trial court’s decision.  We affirm the trial court and remand the case. 
 
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
Charles E. Pierce, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Amazon.com, Inc. 
 
Deborah Revnew, Lebanon, Tennessee, employee-appellee, pro se 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
    
 Deborah Revnew (“Employee”) alleges that she sustained injuries as a result of 
exposure to hazardous chemical fumes on January 29, 2016, while in the course and 
scope of her employment with Amazon.com, Inc. (“Employer”).  Employee was working 
as a “picker” in a “HazMat” section of Employer’s facility when she was exposed to 
toxic chemicals that had been improperly stored.  Although Employee described herself 
as “healthy” and “strong,” the fumes, which were being blown around by a fan, made her 
eyes and lips burn, her heart race, and she developed a headache. Employee became 
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confused and got “really, really sick,” requiring her co-workers’ assistance in navigating 
Employer’s facility.  She reported the exposure at the time it occurred and sought first aid 
at AmCare, Employer’s on-site medical clinic. 
 
Employee was not offered a panel of physicians, and she sought treatment on her 
own at CareSpot on January 30, 2016, complaining of dizziness, confusion, a bad cough, 
and shortness of breath.  After assessing dizziness, shortness of breath, and vision 
problems, Dr. Michelle Cowden, the attending physician, referred Employee for 
examination and testing at Summit Medical Center.  That testing revealed no 
abnormalities. 
 
Employee returned to Dr. Cowden, at which time she was referred for neurology 
and ophthalmology evaluations.  Dr. Cowden prepared a report regarding Employee’s 
exposure and indicated that her condition was causally related to her employment.  
Employee saw Dr. Meredith Ezell for an ophthalmology evaluation on February 29, 
2016, and she saw Dr. Shan-Ren Zhou for a neurological evaluation on March 15, 2016.  
Dr. Zhou ordered an MRI of Employee’s brain, which revealed no intracranial 
abnormality, but did reveal pansinusitis, or inflammation of the sinuses, and he referred 
her to a neuropsychiatrist.  Dr. Ezell diagnosed dry eyes and myopia with presbyopia of 
both eyes.  Employee has received no additional medical care. 
 
At an expedited hearing, Employee was the only witness to testify, and her 
description of the January 29, 2016 incident was uncontradicted.  Following the hearing, 
the trial court found Employee had presented sufficient evidence to establish she was 
likely to succeed at trial and ordered medical benefits with Dr. Cowden, as well as the 
payment of Employee’s incurred medical expenses.  However, the trial court found 
Employee had presented insufficient proof to establish entitlement to temporary disability 
benefits or mileage reimbursement.1  Employer has appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 
and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 
conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 
the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015).  The trial court’s 
decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 
because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge: 
 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge; 
                                                 
1 Employee has not appealed the trial court’s denial of temporary disability benefits or mileage and, thus, 
we need not address those issues. 
3 
 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or clearly an 
unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the 
light of the entire record.”  
 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). 
 
Analysis 
 
A. 
 
 The first issue raised by Employer is “[w]hether the [e]mployee satisfied her 
burden of proof to justify the trial court[’]s award of benefits when the employee did not 
present sufficient evidence that would justify an award of benefits at a hearing on the 
merits.”  In conjunction with this argument, Employer asserts that the medical records 
contain no opinion regarding causation and that a “mere notation in a medical record that 
a patient described an on-the-job injury is insufficient to prove work-relatedness.”  We 
find Employee did satisfy the applicable burden of proof at the expedited hearing and, 
consequently, we agree with the trial court’s award of medical benefits. 
 
 An injured worker has the burden of proof on every essential element of his or her 
claim.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6) (2015); see also Buchanan v. Carlex Glass 
Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *5 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2015).  However, at an expedited hearing, an 
employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence but must come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can 
determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits consistent with 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(1) (2014).  McCord v. Advantage Human 
Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).  This lesser evidentiary standard “does not 
relieve an employee of the burden of producing evidence of an injury by accident that 
arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment at an expedited 
hearing, but allows some relief to be granted if that evidence does not rise to the level of 
a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’”  Buchanan, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
39, at *6.  In reviewing a trial court’s decision that the evidence presented at an expedited 
hearing is sufficient to find an employee is likely to prevail at trial, we must determine 
where the preponderance of the evidence lies. 
 
 Employer argues the trial court erred in awarding benefits because Employee “has 
not shown that she is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits due to the fact that the 
evidence proffered at the Expedited Hearing was insufficient to sustain an award of 
benefits at a final hearing.”  This argument is contrary to the principles set out above.  If 
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an injured worker were required prior to trial to provide proof sufficient to “sustain an 
award of benefits at a final hearing” as Employer suggests, the burden of proof at both 
stages of a claim would be identical and the language “would likely prevail” in section 
50-6-239(d)(1) would be superfluous.  Again, at an expedited hearing where pre-trial 
benefits are at issue, an employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but must come forward with sufficient evidence from 
which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at trial consistent 
with section 50-6-239(d)(1).   
 
 Here, it is uncontradicted that Employee was exposed to chemicals at work, 
immediately began experiencing significant symptoms, and Dr. Cowden assessed 
chemical exposure.  Moreover, we note that the record contains a form dated February 
27, 2016, on which Dr. Cowden indicates the Employee’s condition was causally related 
to her employment.  As Employer has presented no contrary medical proof, Dr. 
Cowden’s opinion is the only medical opinion contained in the record.  Accordingly, we 
have no difficulty affirming the trial court’s decision to order medical benefits at this 
interlocutory stage of the case. 
 
B. 
 
 Employer’s second argument on appeal is that an expedited hearing is not a 
meaningful process when discovery has not been completed and the evidence is 
insufficient to award benefits at a compensation hearing.  According to Employer, “a 
workers’ compensation judge has the ability to compel an employer to provide benefits to 
an employee following an Expedited Hearing even if it appears that the employee will not 
prevail at a final hearing on the merits.”  Thus, Employer maintains that the expedited 
hearing process violates due process.2 
 
 The premise of employer’s due process argument – that a trial court may award 
benefits at an expedited hearing “even if it appears that the employee will not prevail at a 
final hearing on the merits” – is not the standard upon which a trial court determines 
whether an employee is entitled to benefits prior to trial.  If it appears to the trial court 
that an employee is not likely to prevail at trial, the trial court should find that the 
employee has not satisfied his or her burden of proof at the expedited hearing and deny 
relief.  Regardless, the constitutionality of the expedited hearing process was not raised in 
the trial court and thus the trial court had no opportunity to render a decision regarding 
the issue.  Consequently, the issue is waived.  Norton v. McCaskill, 12 S.W.3d 789, 795 
(Tenn. 2000) (Issues raised for the first time on appeal will usually be deemed waived.); 
Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (“It has long been the general 
rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal and this 
                                                 
2 Employer does not indicate whether it relies upon due process principles as embodied in the Tennessee 
Constitution, the United States Constitution, or both. 
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rule applies to an attempt to make a constitutional attack.”); Gilliam v. State, No. 03-C-
01-9411-CR-00406, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 351, at *7-8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 
25, 1995) (“Consideration of an issue raised for the first time on appeal would be unfair 
to the trial court” and “results in ‘ambushing’ the other party.”); see also Appeals Board 
Prac. & Proc. § 5.5 (“Issues or arguments not raised in the Court of Workers’ 
Compensation Claims will be deemed waived on appeal.”). 
 
C. 
 
 Employer’s final issue on appeal concerns whether the trial court erred in 
admitting certain medical records and in admitting statements that it alleges are 
inadmissible under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.   
 
 Regarding the medical records, with the exception of the records from Summit 
Medical Center and Dr. Zhou, each set of medical records was accompanied by a medical 
records custodian’s certification.  Moreover, at the expedited hearing, Employer’s 
attorney indicated that the parties had compiled a set of records “that leads off with 
Summit Medical on the cover page, that we’ve agreed to.”  (Emphasis added.)  
Regardless, while Employer maintains that medical records were admitted into evidence 
that should have been excluded, Employer does not identify those records, and we 
decline to speculate as to what record or records Employer asserts should not have been 
admitted.  “It is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a 
litigant’s case or arguments for him or her,” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the 
Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010), and we decline to search the record 
in an attempt to discover errors that might benefit either party, see McEarl v. City of 
Brownsville, No. W2015-00077-COA-R3-CV, 2015 Tenn. App. LEXIS 894, at *7 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 
With respect to statements Employer asserts were incorrectly admitted as hearsay, 
Employer identifies statements contained in Employee’s testimony regarding what she 
was told by others at Employer’s facility.  Employer also argues that hearsay statements 
contained in Employee’s affidavit were admitted in error.  Employer lodged an objection 
to Employee’s affidavit, and the trial court reserved ruling on that objection until issuance 
of its order.  While the trial court’s order does not address whether Employer’s objection 
was sustained or overruled, there is no indication that, in rendering its decision, the judge 
considered any of the statements Employer cites as objectionable, either in Employee’s 
affidavit or in her testimony at the hearing.  Thus, any error the trial court may have 
committed in admitting these statements was harmless. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence does not preponderate against 
the trial court’s decision at this interlocutory stage of the case.  Nor does the trial court’s 
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decision violate any of the standards set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
217(a)(3).  The trial court’s decision is affirmed, and the case is remanded for any further 
proceedings that may be necessary. 
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